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**METHOD, COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCT, AND DATA PROCESSING  
SYSTEM FOR SOURCE VERIFIABLE AUDIT LOGGING**

**BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION**

**1. Technical Field:**

The present invention relates generally to an improved data processing system and in particular to a data processing system and method for generating source verifiable audit logs. Still more particularly, the present invention provides a processing routine for logging a sequence of audit records in a plurality of log files as a source verifiable contiguous sequence of audit records.

**2. Description of Related Art:**

Many data processing systems maintain highly confidential information such as financial applications, corporate confidential information, and the like, where many user terminals are connected in a distributed processing network. Data files are often stored on storage devices which are commonly accessible by a plurality of data processing systems connected in the network. The diversity of networked system devices at which access can be had to the various data files stored throughout the network presents a significant security problem.

Audit logging mechanisms are often deployed in networked data processing systems. A data processing system in a network runs an audit logging application

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that monitors the data processing system for an audit event, such as an unauthorized access attempt of a file. When the audit event is detected, an audit record is generated that includes attributes of the audit event, such as the time of the audit event, an identification of the user that attempted access of the file, and the like. The audit record is then stored in a log file maintained by the data processing system.

Periodically, the log file is closed and saved. Typically, an audit log is transmitted to a central repository, such as a network server, for storage and analysis by network personnel. When the log file is closed, a new log file is generated and subsequent audit events are stored in the new log file until it is closed and transmitted to the network repository.

The veracity of an audit log file is often critical in various situations. For example, the data processing system that generated the log file often must be conclusively identified for the log file to be admissible as evidence in a court of law. Otherwise, the audit log file may be found as hearsay and thus useless when prosecuting or taking other legal action against a person having committed illegal or unauthorized actions recorded by the audit log.

Thus, it would be advantageous to provide an auditing application that associates an identification of a data processing system with audit log files generated by the data processing system. It would further be advantageous to provide an auditing application that associates a sequence of audit log files with one another

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such that audit records in the sequence of audit log files are verifiable as a contiguous sequence of records. It would be further advantageous to provide a routine for conclusively verifying that a source identification is associated with the data processing system.

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### **SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION**

The present invention provides a method, computer program product, and a data processing system for logging audit events in a data processing system. A sequence of audit records including a final audit record are written to a first log file stored by a data processing system. As the audit records are written to the audit log, a respective first hash value of each audit record is calculated. Responsive to calculating each respective first hash value, a corresponding second hash value is calculated from the first hash value and a value of a register associated with the data processing system. The second hash value is written to the register. A second log file is opened in response to closing the first log file. A final second hash value corresponding to a first hash value of the final audit record is written to a first record of the second log file.

**BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS**

The novel features believed characteristic of the invention are set forth in the appended claims. The invention itself, however, as well as a preferred mode of use, further objectives and advantages thereof, will best be understood by reference to the following detailed description of an illustrative embodiment when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

**Figure 1** depicts a pictorial representation of a network of data processing systems in which the present invention may be implemented according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 2** is a block diagram of a data processing system that may be implemented as a server in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 3** is a block diagram illustrating a data processing system in which the present invention may be implemented according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 4** is a block diagram of an auditing application and trusted platform module interface for generating audit log files in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 5A** is a flowchart of processing performed by an auditing application in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 5B** is a flowchart depicting processing steps performed by a trusted platform module when extending a platform configuration register value with an audit

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record in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 6A** is a diagrammatic illustration of a log file to which audit records are written in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

**Figure 6B** is a diagrammatic illustration of a subsequent log file opened after closing the log file of **Figure 5A** according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention; and

**Figure 7** is a flowchart of processing performed by a validation routine for validating audit log files in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

**DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT**

With reference now to the figures, **Figure 1** depicts a pictorial representation of a network of data processing systems in which the present invention may be implemented. Network data processing system **100** is a network of computers in which the present invention may be implemented. Network data processing system **100** contains a network **102**, which is the medium used to provide communications links between various devices and computers connected together within network data processing system **100**. Network **102** may include connections, such as wire, wireless communication links, or fiber optic cables.

In the depicted example, server **104** is connected to network **102** along with storage unit **106**. In addition, clients **108**, **110**, and **112** are connected to network **102**. These clients **108**, **110**, and **112** may be, for example, personal computers or network computers. In the depicted example, server **104** provides data, such as boot files, operating system images, and applications to clients **108-112**. Clients **108**, **110**, and **112** are clients to server **104**. Network data processing system **100** may include additional servers, clients, and other devices not shown. In the depicted example, network data processing system **100** is the Internet with network **102** representing a worldwide collection of networks and gateways that use the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite of protocols to communicate with one another. At the heart of the Internet is a backbone of high-speed data communication lines between major nodes or host computers, consisting of thousands of commercial, government,

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educational and other computer systems that route data and messages. Of course, network data processing system **100** also may be implemented as a number of different types of networks, such as for example, an intranet, a local area network (LAN), or a wide area network (WAN). **Figure 1** is intended as an example, and not as an architectural limitation for the present invention.

Referring to **Figure 2**, a block diagram of a data processing system that may be implemented as a server, such as server **104** in **Figure 1**, is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Data processing system **200** may be a symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) system including a plurality of processors **202** and **204** connected to system bus **206**. Alternatively, a single processor system may be employed. Also connected to system bus **206** is memory controller/cache **208**, which provides an interface to local memory **209**. I/O bus bridge **210** is connected to system bus **206** and provides an interface to I/O bus **212**. Memory controller/cache **208** and I/O bus bridge **210** may be integrated as depicted.

Peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus bridge **214** connected to I/O bus **212** provides an interface to PCI local bus **216**. A number of modems may be connected to PCI local bus **216**. Typical PCI bus implementations will support four PCI expansion slots or add-in connectors. Communications links to clients **108-112** in **Figure 1** may be provided through modem **218** and network adapter **220** connected to PCI local bus **216** through add-in connectors.



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Additional PCI bus bridges **222** and **224** provide interfaces for additional PCI local buses **226** and **228**, from which additional modems or network adapters may be supported. In this manner, data processing system **200** allows connections to multiple network computers. A memory-mapped graphics adapter **230** and hard disk **232** may also be connected to I/O bus **212** as depicted, either directly or indirectly.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the hardware depicted in **Figure 2** may vary. For example, other peripheral devices, such as optical disk drives and the like, also may be used in addition to or in place of the hardware depicted. The depicted example is not meant to imply architectural limitations with respect to the present invention.

The data processing system depicted in **Figure 2** may be, for example, an IBM eServer pSeries system, a product of International Business Machines Corporation in Armonk, New York, running the Advanced Interactive Executive (AIX) operating system or LINUX operating system.

With reference now to **Figure 3**, a block diagram illustrating a data processing system is depicted in which the present invention may be implemented. Data processing system **300** is an example of a client computer. Data processing system **300** employs a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) local bus architecture. Although the depicted example employs a PCI bus, other bus architectures such as Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP) and Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) may be used. Processor **302** and main memory **304** are connected to PCI

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local bus **306** through PCI bridge **308**. PCI bridge **308** also may include an integrated memory controller and cache memory for processor **302**. Additional connections to PCI local bus **306** may be made through direct component interconnection or through add-in boards. In the depicted example, local area network (LAN) adapter **310**, SCSI host bus adapter **312**, and expansion bus interface **314** are connected to PCI local bus **306** by direct component connection. In contrast, audio adapter **316**, graphics adapter **318**, audio/video adapter **319**, trusted platform, or computing, module (TPM) **340** having platform configuration registers (PCR) **342** are connected to PCI local bus **306** by add-in boards inserted into expansion slots. Expansion bus interface **314** provides a connection for a keyboard and mouse adapter **320**, modem **322**, and additional memory **324**. Small computer system interface (SCSI) host bus adapter **312** provides a connection for hard disk drive **326**, tape drive **328**, and CD-ROM drive **330**. Typical PCI local bus implementations will support three or four PCI expansion slots or add-in connectors.

An operating system runs on processor **302** and is used to coordinate and provide control of various components within data processing system **300** in **Figure 3**. The operating system may be a commercially available operating system, such as Windows XP, which is available from Microsoft Corporation. An object oriented programming system such as Java may run in conjunction with the operating system and provide calls to the operating system from Java programs or applications executing on data processing system **300**. "Java" is a trademark of Sun

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Microsystems, Inc. Instructions for the operating system, the object-oriented programming system, and applications or programs are located on storage devices, such as hard disk drive **326**, and may be loaded into main memory **304** for execution by processor **302**.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the hardware in **Figure 3** may vary depending on the implementation. Other internal hardware or peripheral devices, such as flash read-only memory (ROM), equivalent nonvolatile memory, or optical disk drives and the like, may be used in addition to or in place of the hardware depicted in **Figure 3**. Also, the processes of the present invention may be applied to a multiprocessor data processing system.

As another example, data processing system **300** may be a stand-alone system configured to be bootable without relying on some type of network communication interfaces. As a further example, data processing system **300** may be a personal digital assistant (PDA) device, which is configured with ROM and/or flash ROM in order to provide non-volatile memory for storing operating system files and/or user-generated data.

The depicted example in **Figure 3** and above-described examples are not meant to imply architectural limitations. For example, data processing system **300** also may be a notebook computer or hand held computer in addition to taking the form of a PDA. Data processing system **300** also may be a kiosk or a Web appliance.

**Figure 4** is a block diagram of an auditing application and TPM interface for generating audit log

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files in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Auditing application **400** is implemented as a set of computer executable instructions that may be stored in main memory **304** and executed by processor **302** of data processing system **300** shown in **Figure 3**. Auditing application **400** identifies audit events **410** for logging in audit log files **402a-402n**. Auditing application **400** interfaces with TPM **340**. TPM **340** includes a plurality of platform configuration registers **342a-342x**. In accordance with TPM specifications, TPM **340** has a unique 2048-bit identity referred to as an attestation key identity. The attestation identity key is unique to TPM **340** and thus provides a unique identification of data processing system **300**.

In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, auditing application **400** utilizes one of the plurality of PCRs **342a-342x** for sequentially storing hash values derived from audit records. As audit records are added to a log file, the audit record is hashed, and the hash value of the audit record is conveyed to TPM **340**. TPM **340** provides a function referred to as TPM\_Extend through which a PCR value may be modified. Specifically, the TPM\_Extend function concatenates a value of a PCR addressed by the TPM\_Extend function call and hashes the concatenation. The hashed value of the concatenation is then written as a new value of the PCR addressed by the TPM\_Extend function call. In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, hash values of audit records calculated by

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auditing application **400** are conveyed to TPM **340** as operands of a TPM\_Extend function call. TPM **340**, in turn, concatenates a PCR value with the audit record hash and generates a hash of the concatenation results. The hash value of the concatenation is then stored in the PCR. Any non-reserved PCR may be used by auditing application **400**, and as referred to below, a PCR refers to the particular platform configuration register addressed by auditing application **400**. A non-reserved PCR used by auditing application **400** is referred to as PCR **342** in the Figures below.

Auditing application **400** automatically opens or generates a new audit log file when a log file is closed. The PCR value at the time the new log file is opened is cryptographically signed to produce a signature, and both the signature and the PCR value are stored as a first record of the new log file. New audit events are then recorded in the newly opened audit log file. Thus, a final audit record of one log file and a first audit record of a subsequent log file can be verified to comprise consecutive audit records recorded on the data processing system running auditing application **400**. Moreover, recording the PCR signature in the newly opened audit log file provides a mechanism for verifying the source data processing system that generated the log file by way of the physical association of TPM **340** with data processing system **300**.

**Figure 5A** is a flowchart **500** of processing performed by auditing application **400** of **Figure 4** in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

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Auditing application **400** is initialized, e.g., at system boot, and awaits an audit event to be logged (step **502**). Auditing application **400** is implemented as a computer program product comprising one or more executable instruction sets that may be stored on hard disk **326** of data processing system **300** of **Figure 2** and processed by a processor, such as processor **302**. For example, auditing application **400** may be implemented with the operating system kernel. Alternatively, the auditing application may be implemented as a daemon that monitors system events for an audit event to be logged.

An audit log file is opened (step **503**) and the value of PCR **342** is read (step **504**). For example, a TPM\_Quote function call may be performed on PCR **342**. Execution of the TPM\_Quote function returns the PCR value, a signature of the PCR value, and the signature size. In accordance with TPM standards, the PCR signature is generated by signing the PCR value with the TPM attestation identity key. The PCR value and the PCR signature are then stored as the first record of the newly opened audit log file (step **505**). The signature size may be stored in the first record of the newly opened audit log file as well. The auditing application then begins monitoring for detected audit events (step **506**). Alternatively, in the event that auditing is to be suspended, for example on a system shutdown, the audit log file may be closed and stored after step **505**.

When an event is identified that satisfies one or more audit criterion, an audit record is written to the open audit log file (step **507**). The audit record is a

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record of one or more attributes of the audit event being logged, for example time of audit event, a source, such as a user or source device address, responsible for generation of the audit event, a file name of a file subjected to an unauthorized access attempt, or the like. The audit log file is maintained in a memory storage, such as main memory **304** of data processing system **300** of **Figure 3**.

After writing the audit record to the audit log file, a hash of the record is generated by auditing application **400** (step **508**). For example, auditing application **400** may include or call the well known US secure hashing algorithm-1 (SHA1) to hash the audit record. The hash value of the audit record (designated Hx where x identifies the particular record of the audit log file that is hashed) itself is then concatenated with the value of the PCR addressed by a TPM\_Extend function called by auditing application **400**, and the concatenation is hashed by TPM **340** (step **509**). For example, the hash value Hx is conveyed to TPM **340** as an operand of a TPM\_Extend function call. Other operands, such as a PCR identifier (pcrNum) that specifies the PCR to be extended, in addition to the hash value Hx are conveyed to TPM **340** for executing the TPM\_Extend function. The hash value of the concatenation is then written as a new value of the specified PCR according to the TPM\_Extend functionality.

Auditing application **400** may then poll for an additional audit event to log (step **510**). If a new audit event is identified by auditing application **400**,

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processing returns to step **507** and a new record is written to the log file. If no new audit event is identified at step **510**, auditing application **400** may determine whether the audit log file is to be closed (step **512**). Processing returns to step **510** if the audit log file is to remain open.

When the auditing application determines that the audit log file is to be closed, the log file is stored (step **514**). For example, the log file may be written to hard disk **326** of client **300** shown in **Figure 3**.

Alternatively, the log file may be communicated to a network storage device such as a database maintained in hard disk **232** of data processing system **200** of **Figure 2**.

A new log file is then opened (step **516**). The PCR value and a signature of the PCR value are then received by auditing application **400** by, for example, execution of a TPM\_Quote function (step **518**). The PCR value and the PCR signature are then stored as the first record of newly opened log file (step **520**). Thus, the PCR value stored as the first record of the newly opened audit log file is the value of the PCR at the time the previous audit log file was closed. Auditing may then be continued by adding new audit log records to the new log file, or the new log file may be saved for later retrieval and recording of future audit events (step **522**). The auditing application then exits if auditing is to be suspended (step **524**).

**Figure 5B** is a flowchart depicting processing steps performed by TPM **340** when extending the PCR value with an audit record of the audit log file in accordance with a



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preferred embodiment of the present invention. The processing steps shown in **Figure 5B** generally correspond to step **509** of **Figure 5A**. The hashed audit record Hx is received by TPM **340** with a TPM\_Extend function call (step **530**). TPM **340** concatenates the PCR value with the hashed audit record Hx (step **532**). The results of the concatenation operation are then hashed (step **534**). In accordance with TPM specifications, a hash of a PCR value during a TPM\_Extend operation is performed by a SHA1 hash function. The SHA1 hash value of the concatenation result is then written to the PCR (step **536**) and the extend operation of the PCR ends (step **538**). Accordingly, as additional audit records are written to an audit log file, a PCR value is sequentially updated by deriving a new PCR value from the latest audit log record hash and the previous PCR value.

Thus, a corresponding PCR value is produced as a function of the generated audit record and a previous PCR value as audit records are generated. By signing the final PCR value with an identity associated with the data processing system generating the audit log and storing the signed PCR value as the first record of a new log file, a sequential association between the final record of a first log file and a first record of the new log file is made. Advantageously, consecutive audit log files generated by the auditing application provide a verifiable contiguous sequence of records of audit events.

**Figure 6A** is a diagrammatic illustration of a log file to which audit records are written in accordance

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with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. For illustrative purposes, assume audit log file **600** is generated by auditing application **400** running on data processing system **300** of **Figure 3**. Audit log file **600** includes records **600a-600n**. Record **600a** stores the value of PCR **342** (designated PCR\_value0) at the time log file **600** is opened. Additionally, record **600a** stores the signature of PCR\_value0. The signature size may be stored in record **600a** as well. Records **600b-600n** store audit data corresponding to audit events Event1-EventM detected on data processing system **300**. On detection of a first audit event (Event1), record **600b** is written to log file **600** and a SHA1 hash **610a** of record **600b** is generated by auditing application **400**. In the illustrative examples, the SHA1 hash of an audit record is designated H<sub>x</sub>, where x designates the audit record from which the hash is generated. Additionally, the first record of log file **600a** is considered the 0<sup>th</sup> record. Thus, hash **610a** of record **600b** is designated H<sub>1</sub>. In the illustrative example, the initial value of PCR **342** is designated as PCR\_value0. Upon hashing audit record **600b**, auditing application **400** conveys hash value **610a** to TPM **340** in a TPM\_Extend function call. TPM **340** concatenates hash value **610a** generated by auditing application **400** with initial PCR value PCR\_value0 and hashes the concatenated value. The hashed concatenation value PCR\_value1 is then written to PCR **342**.

As additional audit events (Event2-EventM) are detected by auditing application **400**, records **600c-600n** are added to log file **600**. Hash values **610b-610m** are

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generated for each record **600c-600n**. For each audit record hash value **610b-610m**, corresponding concatenations of the audit record hash values and PCR values (PCR\_value1-PCR\_value(M-1)) are calculated. The results of the concatenations are then hashed, and the hash values (PCR\_value2-PCR\_valueM) of the concatenations are generated and written to PCR **342** by respective TPM\_Extend function calls. Thus, as audit events are logged, the PCR value is updated by a derivation of the most recent audit record and the PCR value at the time the audit event is logged.

In the illustrative example, a final hash value (HM) **610m** is generated from last record **600n** of log file **600**. A corresponding final PCR value PCR\_valueM associated with log file **600** is then generated by hashing the concatenation of the previous PCR value PCR(M-1) and audit record hash value **610m**.

For illustrative purposes, assume log file **600** is closed after writing final record **600n** to log file **600**. Log file **600** is then stored, for example, by communicating log file **600** to data processing system **200** for storage in accordance with step **514** of **Figure 5A**. New log file **601** is opened according to step **516** of **Figure 5A** as shown by the diagrammatic illustration of new log file **601** in **Figure 6B**. The final PCR value (PCR\_valueM) associated with log file **600** is then signed by a TPM\_Quote function call issued by auditing application **400**. PCR\_valueM and the signature of PCR\_valueM are then stored as first record **601a** of new log file **601**. Additionally, a signature size may be

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stored in first record **601a** of log file **601**. In a preferred embodiment, the PCR value is signed with the attestation identity key of TPM **340** by a TPM\_Quote function call issued by auditing application **400**. Storage of the signature of the PCR value read from PCR **342** when log file **600** is closed as a first record of log file **601** provides a mechanism for later verifying that final record **600n** of log file **600** and a first audit record logged of subsequently opened log file **601** are records of consecutive audit events. Moreover, signature of the PCR value with the attestation key identity of TPM **340** provides an accurate verification that log file **601** was generated by data processing system **300**.

Log file **601** may then be stored if auditing application **400** is being closed, e.g., if audit log file **600** was closed in response to a system shutdown event. Alternatively, additional audit records **601b-601c** may be written to log file **601** as additional audit events are identified and corresponding hash values **611a-611b** are generated. Hash values **611a-611b** are used in a similar manner as those described above for updating PCR **342** with values derived from the most recent audit record that has been logged. Audit events detected after generation of audit log file **601** are added to log file **601** as described with reference to **Figures 5A** and **5B** until log file **601** is closed.

**Figure 7** is a flowchart of processing performed by a validation application in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The validation application may be implemented as a set of computer

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executable instructions retrieved and processed by, for example, processor **202** of data processing system **200**. For example, a plurality of log files may be generated by data processing system **300** and stored on data processing system **200** where the log files are validated and archived on hard disk **232**. Alternatively, the validation application may be implemented as a subroutine of auditing application **400** of **Figure 4**.

To verify an audit log file was written by data processing system **200** and to verify the accuracy of the audit records of the audit log file, the validation application parses the PCR value and the signature stored in the first audit record of the audit log file being evaluated. The parsed signature is then evaluated. If the signature is validated, the validation application then parses the PCR value stored in the second record, calculates a hash of the PCR value parsed from the second record, and concatenates the calculated hash with the PCR value parsed from the previous record. The validation application then hashes the concatenation. The validation application repeats the process by sequentially stepping through each record until a final hash value is calculated from a concatenation of a hash of the final record and the PCR value calculated from the previous record. The final hash value may then be compared with the PCR value stored in the first record of the next audit log file in a sequence of stored audit log files. If the compared values match, the evaluated log file is then authenticated.

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The validation application is started (step **702**) and a log file index variable *j* is initialized to 1 (step **703**). A log file *j* to be validated is then read (step **704**). A record index variable *i* is then initialized to 1 (step **705**), and record *i* is parsed from log file *j* (step **706**). Parsing the first record of log file *j* results in recovery of the PCR value when log file *j* was created and the signature generated from the PCR value and the attestation key identity of data processing system **300**. A PCR\_check variable is set to the PCR value parsed from the first record of log file *j* (step **707**). The signature is then evaluated (step **708**) and checked for correctness (step **710**). If the signature is not correct, the log file *j* is determined to be corrupt (step **730**) and the validation routine may then exit (step **732**).

If the signature is evaluated as correct at step **710**, the validation algorithm proceeds to increment the record index variable *i* (step **712**) and parse the *i*<sup>th</sup> record of log file *j* (step **714**). A SHA1 hash (Hash) is calculated from the log file record *i* (step **716**). The hash value is then concatenated with the parsed PCR value (PCR\_check) and a SHA1 hash of the concatenation is calculated and stored as a new PCR\_check value (step **718**). Log file *j* is then evaluated to determine if additional audit records exist. If additional audit records remain in log file *j*, processing returns to step **712** where the record index variable *i* is incremented.

When each record has been hashed and a corresponding PCR\_check value has been calculated, the validation routine proceeds to increment the log file index variable

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j (step **722**). The next log file j is read and the first record is parsed (step **724**). The PCR value of the first record is recovered from the parsed first record and indicates the PCR value of the TPM when log file j was created. The final PCR\_check value calculated from the evaluated log file is then compared with the parsed PCR value of log file j (step **726**). If the PCR\_check value is equivalent to the parsed PCR value of log file j, the evaluated log file (log file j-1) is determined to be valid (step **728**). Otherwise, the evaluated log file is determined to be corrupt (step **730**). The validation routine may then exit (step **732**). Alternatively, the validation algorithm may repeat for a validation analysis of the current log file j.

Thus, an auditing application that associates an identification of a data processing system with audit log files generated by the data processing system is provided. A platform configuration register is iteratively derived from sequential audit records as the audit records are generated. An attestation identity key of a trusted platform module is used for generating a signature of a platform configuration register value. The signature is generated by signing the value of the platform configuration register upon closing a first log file. The signature is saved with the platform configuration register value as a record of a subsequent log file used for recording audit records. Thus, a data processing system is verifiable as a source of sequentially generated logs files. Moreover, audit events of a log file and audit events of a subsequently

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generated log file are verifiably a contiguous sequence of audit records.

It is important to note that while the present invention has been described in the context of a fully functioning data processing system, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the processes of the present invention are capable of being distributed in the form of a computer readable medium of instructions and a variety of forms and that the present invention applies equally regardless of the particular type of signal bearing media actually used to carry out the distribution. Examples of computer readable media include recordable-type media, such as a floppy disk, a hard disk drive, a RAM, CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs, and transmission-type media, such as digital and analog communications links, wired or wireless communications links using transmission forms, such as, for example, radio frequency and light wave transmissions. The computer readable media may take the form of coded formats that are decoded for actual use in a particular data processing system.

The description of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, and is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the invention in the form disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. The embodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention, the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the invention for



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various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.